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What explains the timing of the establishment of public sector pensions
and the adoption of speciWc provisions that inXuenced the behavior of pub-
lic sector workers? As with any social science question, a deWnitive answer
is not easily achieved. Any number of social and political factors could con-
tribute to the explanation, and the offsetting effects of many of these fac-
tors could contribute more in the way of obfuscation than illumination.
While acknowledging the importance of these broad and complex social
factors, this volume focuses primarily on the economic factors that inXu-
enced the timing and character of public sector pensions over the past two
millennia or so. Old age, retirement, and disability pensions were contrac-
tual arrangements between workers and the state. Hence, any analysis of
these pensions will be colored by the economics of contracting between
agents in the labor market. Various exogenous factors such as war between
England and France or the American Revolution alter the prices and/or
constraints of one or both parties to the pension contract. In reviewing the
history of public sector pensions in this light, four major conclusions con-
cerning the development of public sector pensions in the United States
can be reached.
First, as with any contractual arrangement, monitoring costs played a
crucial role in the timing and characteristics of public sector pensions. In
no case was this issue more important than in determining the historic dif-
ference between the compensation of army and navy personnel. Because land
forces were inherently easier to monitor than those at sea, governments
explicitly compensated their naval forces with share contracts and the shares
were paid from prizes. While prizes in the form of plunder and rapine had
long been a feature of the compensation of land forces and were recognized
as such by the laws of war and sound military doctrine, unlike the naval
prize system the exact terms of these contracts were seldom explicitly deter-
mined. More importantly, the sacking of towns to compensate the troops
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experienced a period of long-run decline at exactly the time when the cap-
ture, adjudication, and liquidation of naval prizes reached an apex. Since
the pension was part of overall compensation, it makes sound economic
sense to tie the pension to prizes just as other compensation was tied to
prizes. Starting with the medieval Danish kings and proceeding through
the U.S. navy pension fund, which lasted until 1936, monies from the sale
prizes paid Western naval personnel on duty, while disabled, or after retire-
ment for a thousand years, a venerable institution indeed.
Second, for some time after their advent, funded pensions presented
their trustees with a series of moral hazards and administrative problems
that in some cases were not overcome and in others were only overcome
fairly recently. With respect to both of these problems, the U.S. navy pen-
sion fund offers what could arguably be considered an example without peer.
Fund managers faced two important moral hazards. One was the result of
the absence of oversight of government and quasi-government accounts in
the early republic. In the absence of standard accounting procedures, low-
cost information technologies, and stringent reporting requirements, the
managers and agents of the navy pension fund appear to have succumbed
to the temptation to manipulate its accounts to their personal advantage.
The second moral hazard faced by the navy pension fund was the asymme-
try between the burden of losses and gains from the fund’s risky assets. If
the assets proved to be proWtable, then the fund’s beneWciaries (and to
an extent its trustees and managers) stood ready to reap the rewards of
those gains. If, however, the assets collapsed, then the fund simply turned
to the Treasury to make its claimants whole. It proved to be a poor bargain
for taxpayers. 
The early pension fund trustees also faced major administrative prob-
lems associated with the management of a pension fund. There was little
precedent for managing a pension fund. Private and public accounts were
maintained only in the loosest sense of the terms. Considerable effort was
needed to reassemble and value the assets of the navy pension fund. Recall
that the fund was required by federal law to submit its accounts to Congress
annually. Those accounts of pension fund activity remain part of the pub-
lic record of the United States, although the estimates presented in this vol-
ume should be considered only educated guesses at the cash positions of
the fund during the nineteenth century. In addition to the accounting and
reporting problems encountered by the fund’s managers, acquiring politi-
cally acceptable, blue chip assets proved to be a bit of a problem as well.
The U.S. government retired its outstanding debt during the fund’s heyday
and the fund turned to high-risk private equities and ultimately insolvent
state debt. The two leading candidates for high-quality equity shares were
stock in the Bank of the United States and British government debt. Both
were politically unacceptable due to various forms of opposition. The Bank
of the United States was perceived to be a Federalist institution in an age of
11Chap11.qxd  2/27/03  9:36 AM  Page 219
Democratic ascendance. As for British consols, there were no bluer chips in
Western Wnance, but the fact that the fund had been largely built with the
blood of U.S. seamen on the decks of British prizes during the War of 1812
proved an insurmountable obstacle. British atrocities on land during the
war did not help the case. Thus, the fund may have been ahead of its time
or may simply be a lesson for those who wish to “privatize” assets that are
irrevocably dedicated to paying “public” liabilities.
Third, there was a tremendous growth in public sector pensions at the
local level in the early part of the twentieth century. This growth was the
result of two fundamental features of public Wnance and political economy
in the United States. The Wrst feature is a function of the Wnancial and hier-
archical relationship between the various political units. The federal gov-
ernment creates states; states create minor and subordinate political units,
like counties, cities, airport authorities and so forth. When the state creates
a city, the state is essentially agreeing to share its tax collecting monopoly
with another political unit. In return, the state expects the municipality to
provide a set of public services. In many states, the city, town, or village
must offer a certain number of such services in order to maintain a munic-
ipal charter. In addition, should the public entities created by the state
become bankrupt, the state is ultimately the receiver of the bankrupt entity.
This is a costly political crisis that no state legislature would like to en-
counter. Hence, the states constrained and encumbered the Wnances of
the subordinate political units they created. A municipality or local school
board was not typically at liberty to make promises to workers, collect rev-
enues at will, and set the monies aside in a fund to be managed by munici-
pally determined trustees. As the “politicians of last resort” should anything
go wrong with this process, state legislators were careful to spell out the con-
ditions under which minor political units could promise a pension, collect
revenues for its payment, and manage any surplus that might result. Thus,
it was ultimately enabling legislation at the state level that led to the rapid
growth of public sector pensions in the early decades of this century.
What factors stimulated the state governments to enact legislation allow-
ing the establishment of pensions by municipalities? Here the answer lies in
the political economy of public sector employment. The late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries saw the beginning of the demise of patronage at
the lower levels of public sector employment. Workers might still be hired
because of their family’s party afWliation and political connections, but
increasingly subsequent employment at city hall, or the War Department for
that matter, did not depend on which party controlled the mayor’s ofWce or
the White House. Thus public sector employment became lifetime employ-
ment, and by converting patronage positions to what were essentially life
tenured public jobs created an enormous opportunity for the party that
could take advantage of it. Once the conversion from grateful patron to
civil servant was well underway, public sector administrators realized that
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many workers would remain on the public payroll until they literally died
on the job. As a result, implicit long-term contracts with public employees
became the norm. The new employment relationship was one in which in
exchange for a formal pension as a component of compensation, workers
accepted mandatory retirement policies as a condition of employment. 
Fourth, and Wnally, there is a need to consider the impact of the dramatic
increase in public sector pension coverage in the early twentieth century.
The early decades of that century saw a very rapid expansion in the share
of public sector workers covered by a pension in the United States. This was
also the period of rapid expansion of private sector plans (Ransom, Sutch,
and Williamson 1991, 1993). Curiously, the impact on the labor force from
this dramatic change is not as straightforward as one might think. On the
one hand, we might logically expect that more pension coverage would lead
to more retirement. Higher retirement income should lower the labor force
participation rates of older workers. Another way of stating this would be to
say that the accumulation of pension wealth might have increased the
demand for leisure in old age; that is, pension income provides older work-
ers with the opportunity to consider retirement as a viable option. Econo-
mists would call this an income effect. 
On the other hand, the value of the pension typically grew with time on
the job. At the margin, the possibility of accumulating more pension wealth
by staying on the job increased the price of leisure. As the price of a good
increases, typically people consume less of it. This is particularly true if the
pension were conditional on the worker remaining with the Wrm up until
the speciWed retirement age. Workers might lose the entire pension if they
left government employment too soon. Economists would call this a substi-
tution effect. After a person reaches retirement age, the accrual of further
pension wealth drops sharply, thus encouraging retirement at this time. So
the income effect suggests a decline in labor force participation at older
ages, while the substitution effect suggests that workers Wrst remain on the
job until the retirement age and then leave after attaining that age. In fact,
during the Wrst few decades of the century, there was an upward trend in
the labor force participation rate of older workers (Ransom, Sutch, and
Williamson 1991, 1993). This Wnding suggests that the substitution effect of
these early pensions overwhelmed the income effect, and thus they tended
to induce older worker to stay on the job longer than they otherwise would
have. While this seems slightly paradoxical at Wrst glance, it might go a long
way toward explaining why many early plans had mandatory retirement
provisions. To the extent that these public sector pensions kept good work-
ers on the job and rewarded them after they retired, it can be concluded
that they represent an example of sound public policy.
Although the aggregate evidence suggests that the labor force participa-
tion of older men rose slightly at the time public sector pension coverage
was expanding rapidly in the United States, the issue of cause and effect
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is somewhat more complicated. The basic theoretical question is, ceteris
paribus, did an increase in pension wealth lead to an increase in time on the
job? Dora Costa (1994) has explored this and other related questions, in
considerable detail. Her evidence suggests that the income effect was large
and that it probably overwhelmed the substitution effect. She estimated that
the income elasticity of retirement (that is, not participating in the labor
force) was between 0.50 and 0.73; that is, a one percent increase in income
led to a roughly one-half percent decrease in the labor force participation
of older men, controlling for other factors. The size of this effect is con-
siderably larger than recent estimates of the retirement elasticity of Social
Security (Costa 1994). The decline in the size of the income effect is prob-
ably the result of the increase in the quantity and quality of leisure activi-
ties. In other words, the real, quality-adjusted price of leisure has fallen, and
the willingness of older workers to change their labor force participation in
the response to a change in retirement income has fallen as well.
Lessons for the Twenty-First Century
While this analysis of the development of public sector pensions is primar-
ily an economic assessment of the history of these plans, that history
provides a set of lessons for policymakers in the twenty-Wrst century. The dom-
inant public sector pension issue of the new century is how to modify Social
Security to the new economic and demographic realities. Optimal policy
depends on a careful assessment of the risk of changing Social Security
from a deWned beneWt plan to a deWned contribution plan, and whether
individually or collectively, the account balances of the system should be
invested in assets other than government bonds. The history of the navy
pension provides a unique opportunity to examine how a government pen-
sion fund was managed in the early days of our republic. The operations of
the fund merit careful review by those interested in reforming the modern
Social Security system.
The history of the navy pension fund shows that when given the oppor-
tunity to invest pension funds in private equities, the trustees devoted a sub-
stantial share of these funds to the stock of local politically connected
banks. In the short run, these equities provided a somewhat higher return
than at least some alternative investments; however, each of the institutions
ultimately failed. This brief experience illustrates the well-known higher
risk associated with private equities compared to government securities, a
relationship that has frequently been considered in conjunction with pro-
posals to devote some of the Social Security trust fund to the stock market
or to allow participants with individual accounts in a revised Social Security
program is to have a broad range of investment opportunities. 
In addition to the inherent riskiness of equities relative to debt instru-
ments, the risk-return choices of the navy pension fund managers were
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questionable. They did not purchase high-quality stock in the First or Sec-
ond Bank of the United States. Ignoring these opportunities seems to have
been related to political pressures; those banks were part of Federalist, and
later Whig, policies during an age in which Democrats dominated the
White House. Another aspect of proposed reforms of the contemporary
Social Security program is whether investments would be targeted toward
socially desirable investments and away from companies deemed to be
“poor citizens.” Many countries use some of their pension funds to support
government projects and economic development that may mean lower
returns for participants. The history of the navy pension fund indicates that
such political involvement in investment decisions can cost the fund the
opportunity for higher returns.
The issues surrounding the operation of the fund and the use of agents
as investment managers also provide some guidance for today’s debate. Evi-
dence indicates that the operations of the pension fund had a rather high
administrative cost in absolute terms, and they certainly were high relative
to purchases of readily available government debt. Several analysts have
pointed out the high administrative cost of individual accounts compared
to the continued management of the existing Social Security trust fund.
Another type of risk that is often overlooked by many proponents of the
current Social Security system is the risk that the government will change
the rules of the pension plan. The history of the navy pension fund pro-
vides some clear guidance on this issue. When the pension system seemed
to have sufWcient, even surplus, funds, Congress regularly increased bene-
Wts and increased coverage often at the expense of the long-run Wnancial
status of the program—though by actuarial standards the surpluses were
not as large as they appeared. BeneWts were also decreased or eliminated
when the impact of these changes was realized. When considering the risk
of investing in private markets and the desirability of individual accounts,
one should also consider the risk of the government’s changing the rules
and the impact of such changes on the status of the retirement program
and one’s individual beneWts. Readers of this volume will note the striking
parallels to the issues facing the United States as it considers major modi-
Wcations to the Social Security program for the twenty-Wrst century. 
Lessons from the Early Development of Public Pensions 223
11Chap11.qxd  2/27/03  9:36 AM  Page 223
